Sylvan wrote:To be completely honest, I am slightly baffled by your post, abb3w. The first thing I thought of when I read it was a quote from a book I read recently (The Wise Man's Fear, one of the most excellent pieces of fantasy I have read in years, including Erfworld) that said "he writes as though he is afraid someone reading will actually understand him".
Nah. Using non-technical terminology would just take too much typing.
Sylvan wrote:I think part of the root of your argument is that "pain is bad and therefore ought to be avoided" does not mean "we ought to use avoiding pain as a justification for providing answers to 'moral' questions".
No; that "pain is bad compare to the lack of pain" is (1) an oversimplification and (2) an assertion not justified from prior axiomatic premises, but rather requires (or must itself be taken as) a new additional axiom.
Sylvan wrote:Personally speaking, I don't see the flaw in Harris' argument that you do. What I'd like to ask is what you perceived his 'ought' to be. I heard it as Harris saying "Reality is objective, therefore we ought to base our morality on objective standards." Well, that and "Traditionally our morality is defined by the suffering of intelligent things, therefore our objective measurements ought to be based on what causes something to suffer/prosper".
Which is more or less what I understood. And wanting to use objective standards is fine, on one level. The catch being, having an "objective" mechanism to answer questions about how the universe IS does not give a full basis for ordering choices of what OUGHT to be done. True, it is useful, insofar as ordering of choices is easier if you can agree what the choices ARE; and for those who take a consequentialist approach, for determining what the consequences will BE. However, that there are choices and consequences is insufficient; one also needs some additional axiom to indicate which of the possibly orderings is the ordering you're talking about.
Or in other words, he can show that this IS fairly close to what humans mean by "ought"; this does not, however, necessarily imply that this is what OUGHT to be used to order choices. (There's further subtleties with the differences between the "fairly close" of instinctive/traditional morality, but those are more cosmetic.)
Which is an annoyingly abstract point, I will admit.
Sylvan wrote:I'll take it as a given that "tradition" has nothing to do with objective morality
"Nothing" overstates it. Tradition is a body of data, giving some indication what societies of various degrees of historical persistence have used for orderings.
Sylvan wrote:, but I think Harris makes a lot of sense when he describes how we have different standards of morality concerning things like rocks, plants, insects, animals, and then fellow primates/human beings.
Which bears on the relation of Haidt's "INGROUP" metric/flavor/dimension of morality rather more than here.
Sylvan wrote: Maybe the issue here is a matter of semantics with regards to the words "absolute morality"?
Actually, it's more semantic with what is meant by "morality" and associated order-related concepts (good, evil, purpose, et cetera).
Sylvan wrote:I don't think he claimed that we are as of yet capable of ordering these measurements into any form of orderly or partially ordered set
He seems to think we can order the choice set of {"kill all the humans slowly and painfully", "let the humans live in relative comfort"}, with "kill all the humans slowly and painfully" being better "let the humans live in relative comfort". So... wrong.
Sylvan wrote:My apologies if this post is simply a lack of imagination/cognition on my part, I just honestly don't get what you are trying to say and don't see any illogical leap from "this is how it is" to "this is how it ought to be" present in the video linked.
From the classic:
David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature wrote:In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.