Denar wrote:Well, you're ignoring the fact that brains have no say in their construction, for starters. You've defined your own point against yourself by implying that brains "want" these things.
Demanding that Free Will bootstrap itself into existence is just another impossible demand made upon it for no clear reason. I don't make that demand. Why would you? (aside: it seems like it'd be easier to regain your true love by the conditions laid out in Scarborough Fair than to think of a consistent universe that can contain what you call Free Will) Once you exist as a person, you're eligible to have free will (subject to impairment). Before you existed, you couldn't have it. In Short Circuit, Number 5 had free will after being struck by lightning, and not before then.
Free will is not conserved. It can be created or destroyed. Why would you think that Free Will should be eternal, without beginning or end?
Denar wrote:And you're ignoring that sub atomic particles do exist, and have imagined that "their sum is greater than their parts", and that this sum is "free will". It's a nice idea but it's not real - it's not there - like a chair.
You're rushing here, stringing together an irrelevant false statement with painted-stupid words you put into my mouth, and a nonsequitur into one sentence. Then a flat denial and another false statement. This does not come across to me as a serious effort to get at the truth. I don't know what's going on here. The kindest interpretation is simply that you're really confident so you're not willing to put much effort in. If you're putting in this little effort, posting on the subject at all is disrespectful.
But I'll respond anyway...
1) "you're ignoring that sub atomic particles do exist"
No, I don't. I don't need to do that, because it doesn't impact my definition of free will. I'm explaining compatibilism
and why your definition of free will is useless - why would subatomic particles make a difference? We are able to have free will because
they are at least partly deterministic (pure randomness would not enable the machinery of consciousness; we can survive some random noise).
2) "have imagined that "their sum is greater than their parts", and that this sum is "free will"."
Do you have any freaking idea how much computation tiny amounts of matter are capable of? We are vastly
underperforming the potential of our constituent parts in those terms.
The sum does have some properties not possessed by the parts, but that's not logically fallacious at all. In fact, assuming that this cannot be so is the Fallacy of Division, applied in contrapositive.
3) "It's a nice idea but it's not real - it's not there - like a chair."
Yes, what I've described isn't what you call free will - nothing is or could be. I'm explaining why what I've described fits the term. What I've described is made of stuff - our brains. If chairs exist, then surely you'll grant that brains exist. And if you grant that, then you probably grant that brains have the properties I've described.
It seems a little bit like you're jumping from determinism to the idea that since there's one fixed outcome, causality loses meaning. If X causes Y, then Y was going to happen anyway, so why would you say that X caused Y? Mechanistic determinism isn't a bunch of windowless monads following preprogrammed dances. There's causal structure. And Free Will is a kind of causal structure, made of stuff.
arkerpay wrote:So if in real life any of you meet Denar and decide to punch him in the nose, Denar won't be upset at you. Denar will know that you didn't REALLY decide to punch him in the nose. The UNIVERSE decided to punch him in the nose.
Moreover, it was just an illusion of pain and an illusion of being punched in the first place, because only chairs are real!